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SUPREME COURT NORMS OF
IMPERSONALITY
SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF
PRECEDENT. By Randy J. Kozel.' Cambridge University
Press. 2017. PP. x + 180. $99.99 (hardcover), $34.99 (paper).
Allison Orr Larsen'
INTRODUCTION
In his new book, Settled Versus Right: A Theory of Precedent,
Professor Randy Kozel assumes a rare role for law professors; he
serves as a helpful collaborator rather than a snarky critic.
Professor Kozel seeks a commitment to the impersonal features
of Supreme Court decisions and a retreat from individual disputes
over interpretive philosophy when it comes to discussion of
precedent. His optimism is contagious, and Kozel has made bold
strides towards a "second best stare decisis" that can be applied
regardless of vast disagreement on the merits. Cynics may remain
unpersuaded that nine individual Justices can transcend
interpretive disagreements and commit to a communal
understanding of a doctrine of precedent. But even for those
cynics, Professor Kozel's work provides a powerful lesson about
norms. The Supreme Court is more than just a building across
from the Capitol that houses nine individual lawmakers. As a two
hundred and thirty-year-old institution with a rich tradition of its
own, the Court has developed a set of distinct norms over time.
From "the rule of four" (not needing a majority to grant cert) to
the taboo of vote-trading, to the use of a plural noun when
referring to past decisions, to the expectation that every word
1. Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
2. Professor of Law, College of William & Mary. This Review was written for a
conference in celebration of Randy Kozel's book, Settled Versus Right: A New Theory of
Precedent (Cambridge University Press 2017). I am very grateful to the organizers of the
event, Kurt Lash & Jason Mazzone, for inviting me, and to my fellow participants for an
engaging and inspiring discussion.
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change in a draft opinion merits a re-circulation, the Court has
developed its own norms of impersonality- norms that
emphasize the "we" over the "I's."
This Review will explore Supreme Court norms that both
help and hinder Professor Kozel's aspiration for impersonality at
the Court. I will reiterate my old complaint about "self stare
decisis" - the habit of reiterating a dissenting view each time an
issue presents itself again; and I will offer a new norm when it
comes to discussion of precedent. Even if the Justices can't agree
on whether a precedent is worthy of overruling, it seems a modest
request to suggest such discussions happen at the outset, perhaps
in their own initially circulated opinion or dedicated time at
Conference. Bifurcating the discussion in this way (separating the
discussion of precedent from the discussion of the merits) will
help abate the temptation to gloss over the precedential
discussion in order to get to the particulars of the case at hand.
My hope is that norm changes such as these will further Professor
Kozel's laudable goal of changing "attitudes" and will capture
many of the benefits he articulates that arise from demanding a
common set of playing rules for nine individual decisionmakers.
I. WHY IS IMPERSONALITY IMPORTANT?
An important premise of Professor Kozel's new book is that
a collective doctrine of stare decisis is critical to demonstrating
that the Constitution "truly is more than what five Justices say it
is" (p. 5). His goal is to create a theory of stare decisis that is
"designed to enhance the stability and impersonality of
constitutional law" (p. 6). And he makes a powerful case for why
this goal is an important one.
Professor Kozel argues that precedent has value in
conserving resources, acknowledging our limitations as individual
decisionmakers, treating similar cases in a similar way, and
furnishing common ground for justices who often disagree (pp.
36-45). But, to me, the most compelling reason Professor Kozel
offers for a communal understanding of precedent is its part in
bolstering what Professor Kozel calls "impersonality" at the
Supreme Court. By "impersonality," Kozel means making "judge
specific characteristics less salient in determining legal rights" (p.
41). As he elegantly explains,
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to follow the decisions of one's predecessors is to embrace a
conception of a court continuing over time. By deferring to
precedent, a [lJ]ustice highlights her membership in a larger
institution that predates her and will continue long after she is
gone.... This is another way of saying the rule of law prevails
over the rule of men and women (pp. 41-42).
It is too easy to shorten this rationale (as we often do) to the
simple-and all too loaded-word, "legitimacy." The Court must
keep more or less consistent over time, the common argument
goes, in order to maintain its stature in the eyes of the public.3 But,
as Professor Kozel helpfully reminds us, this argument undersells
the value of impersonality quite a bit. What hangs in the balance
of the precedent debate is more than just an approval rating for
the Justices in a national opinion poll. The stakes are much higher
than that. In Professor Kozel's words, driving the commitment to
impersonality at the Court is "the principle that all government
officials, including judges, are bound by rules" (p. 42). Debates
about precedent are so important, therefore, because the rule of
law is so important.
The rest of Professor Kozel's book is devoted to developing
a theory of what he calls "second best stare decisis" - a theory that
operates independently of any interpretive methodology and
seeks to unify judicial voices that find themselves so often in
discord. Professor Kozel seeks to offer a set of rules about
precedent that many can join as a second-best solution (second-
best to the result that would be reached under his or her preferred
methodology). The goal of second-best stare decisis is to prevent
discussions of precedent from getting bogged down into the
merits and "becoming an echo chamber for controversial
assertions about which theory of constitutional interpretation is
best" (p. 139).
There are likely some cynics who find this laudable goal a bit
out of reach. The cynic's concern is that no one Justice will check
his interpretative baggage at the door in order to truly engage with
the question of precedent in a way that is detached from his other
commitments. The fear is that a communal doctrine of stare
decisis will not constrain at all; a Justice will just manipulate the
seemingly objective factors of second best stare decisis (reliance
interests, factual change and the like) in order to reach the result
3. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864-69 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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that best aligns with his favored interpretive philosophy or
normative priors or even the outcome that he wants to reach in
the individual case.
But even for those cynics, Professor Kozel's work sheds light
on an important problem and a potential solution. For hundreds
of years, the Justices of the Supreme Court have created and
maintained important norms of impersonality. They act and speak
as a "we" over time. Even if those norms don't constrain in any
technical sense, they enact a powerful force of habit.
To take an analogy that may speak to dog lovers, a dog on a
leash will sometimes stay still in the park even when there is no
one holding on to the leash's handle. Because the dog is
accustomed to the constraint, it toes the line even when it need
not. 4 So, too, can norms of impersonality act to constrain a Justice
even when it does not formally bind her. The Court is an
institution with a rich history and a prized internal reputation for
objectivity and fairness. Perhaps it is time to leverage those norms
of impersonality to change how the Justices discuss precedent.
II. EXISTING NORMS OF IMPERSONALITY AT THE
SUPREME COURT
When a new member of the Court gets sworn in and walks
up those stairs at number One First Street for the first time, he or
she will quickly encounter some internal norms (and even more
important norms than the weekly rotation of Wednesday mac and
cheese in the cafeteria). These norms are the rules of the road-
common traditions passed down from one generation of Justices
to the next. Of course Supreme Court norms are not formally
binding, nor are they necessarily permanent, but they have proved
to be sticky over time and (like for the dog in the park) they can
do important constraining work.
One norm at the Court that is firmly entrenched is the
unwritten rule against vote trading. While some forms of strategic
behavior at the Court are seen as permissible and perhaps
inevitable (like, for example "insincere voting"-voting for one's
second choice-to form a majority coalition), the prevailing
consensus is that explicit vote trading between cases is "roundly
4. As my co-panelists helpfully observed, this characteristic is not true of all dogs
and likely has much to do with how an individual dog is trained-an aspect of the analogy
that is still relevant to the present discussion.
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condemned., 5 This norm means one Justice won't say to another
"I'll vote with you in case X if you vote for me in case Y."6 There
are likely many reasons for this norm: when votes are traded
across cases it decreases meaningful participation by the parties
in any given case and cuts against the idea that deliberation
between multiple minds within any one case improves
decisionmaking. But another reason for this norm has to be
related to fostering impersonality at the Court. As Evan
Caminker explains in his article on the subject, there is a
"commodification objection" to vote trading or a fear of a
"market orientation towards judicial decisionmaking."' If votes
can be traded across cases then that makes the judicial process
look more like political wheeling and dealing by nine individuals
and less like the work of a deliberative independent body that acts
as one unit. Vote-trading cuts against, in other words, a sense of
Supreme Court impersonality.
A second Supreme Court norm is what has been called an
"agenda-setting norm" colloquially known as "the Rule of Four."8
Under well-settled tradition (but not a written rule), when the
Justices decide whether to hear a case it only take four votes to
grant certiorari, not a majority of the Court.9 This non-majority
rule is buttressed by another norm-"the Rule of Three"-
meaning that it only takes three votes to hold a case while decision
of a related issue is already pending at the Court.10
Behind these agenda-setting norms is the sense that oral
argument and briefing can change one's mind about a case, and
thus if enough members of the Court think a case is cert-worthy it
makes sense to hear the case and see if a fifth member can be
convinced. In the words of Justice Brennan: "in the context of a
preliminary five to four vote to deny, five give four an opportunity
5. Evan Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting on Multi-Member Courts, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 2297, 2300 (1999).
6. Id. at 2331. ("It is very difficult to identify clear examples of explicit vote trading.
My own sense, in accord with that of other scholars, is that explicit vote trading rarely-
and perhaps never -takes place.")
7. Id. at 2351-52.
8. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 113 (1998).
9. The Rule of Four dates back at least until 1925 (or at least that is the year the
norm became public). See Richard Revesz & Pam Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the
Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (1988).
10. Id. at 1068.
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to change at least one mind."" Indeed, this norm has led to a
separate less well-known tradition-a "join three" custom.12
Under this norm, if three Justices want to hear a case, and a fourth
Justice is on the fence, the undecided member of the Court will
cast her vote to "join three" and grant certiorari to hear the case.
The idea behind this norm is a "team player" sensibility. For the
Justice who supplies that fourth vote to grant cert she is sending a
signal: we are more than just expressing individual preferences
and there is value to deliberation and consideration as a collective
unit. If three of her colleagues are sure a case is cert-worthy, then
that is enough of a reason to at least flesh out the arguments and
hear what the litigants have to say. There are institutional reasons,
in other words, to vote to take a case even if as an individual one
is unsure the case is cert-worthy.
A third-more subtle-norm at the Court is the use of a
plural pronoun when describing majority opinions (even old
ones). When Justices refer to outcomes and rationales of past
cases, they use the word "we," even for cases that were decided
long before the current Justices were born. And when an opinion
is announced it is styled not as "the majority opinion," but as "the
opinion of the Court."' 3 Relatedly, any time an author of an
opinion changes a word of that opinion, the norm is that he will
re-circulate the draft again to make sure that those Justices who
have joined the initial draft opinion are comfortable with the
change. Further, a majority will try "to accommodate a marginal
Justice" by tweaking the opinion so the unsure Justice can join it,
even when a five-vote coalition is already formed and that
"marginal" vote is not strictly necessary.14 These norms of
authorship play a role in enforcing impersonality at the Court.
Every time a Justice writes the word "we" instead of "I" he is
subtly enforcing-to himself as well as to others-that the
enterprise of Supreme Court decisionmaking is a collective one.
11. Id. at 1100 (quoting Straight v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2004, 2006 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
12. S.M., How the Supreme Court Chooses Its Cases, THE ECONOMIST EXPLAINS
(Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/02/cconomist-
explains-19 ("When Warren Burger was [C]hief [Jlustice in the 1970s and 1980s, a "join-
3" tradition meant that a [J]ustice might extend a courtesy fourth vote to supplement those
of three of his colleagues who wanted to hear a case. This form of collegiality helped swell
the [C]ourt's docket to over 150 cases, but it is largely a thing of the past.").
13. Lewis Kornhauser & Lawrence Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in
Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1993).
14. Caminker, supra note 5, at 2322.
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This list of impersonality norms is only the beginning. There
are plenty of other norms that have evolved around the Court's
work: no one but the nine Justices can enter the conference room
to discuss the cases at the end of the argument week, the Justices
offer their comments at conference in the order of their
seniority, 5 a brand new Justice is typically assigned an "easy"
unanimous opinion to write first, 6 and the Chief Justice attempts
to assign opinions in a way that divides the workload evenly. 7
Moreover (in perhaps my favorite tradition) before proceeding to
the bench or to conference the Justices all shake hands-a ritual
that began in 1888 and requires 36 different handshakes."8
Why do the Justices conform to these norms? To be sure, one
reason is just to make life more pleasant for people who work
together every day. As Chief Justice Warren explained after he
retired, "[w]hen you are going to serve on a court.., for the rest
of your productive days, you accustom yourself to the institution
like you do to the institution of marriage, and you realize that you
can't be in a brawl every day and still get satisfaction out of life."' 9
But there is more to it than that. As Justice O'Connor put it
when explaining the handshake tradition:
[It's] a symbol of work we do as a collegial body. That is, you
may be temporarily miffed because you received a spicy
dissenting opinion from a colleague, but when we go to sit on
the bench, we look at each other, shake hands, and it's a way of
saying, "We're all in this together." We care about this
institution more than our individual egos, and we are all
devoted to keeping the Supreme Court in the place that it is-
as a co-equal third branch of government and I think a model
for the world in collegiality and independence of judges.20
"We're all in this together." The sentence bears repeating.
Justice O'Connor is echoing what Professor Kozel calls the need
for "impersonality" at the Court; it is the desire to be a "we"
rather than a set of "I's." And the reason for this impersonality is
15. CLARE CUSHMAN, COURTWATCHERS: EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS IN SUPREME
COURT HISTORY 101 (2011).
16. Id. at 103. Justice Ginsburg has lamented that her first assignment was not in
keeping with this tradition (or "legend") that a "brand new Justice be slated for an
uncontroversial unanimous opinion." Id.
17. Id. at 154-55.
18. Id. at 146-47.
19. Id. at 143.
20. Id. at 147.
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more than just for professional collegiality. The idea is that by
building this sense of institutional duty-reflected in internal
norms-the Court reinforces the notion that (in Professor Kozel's
words) "bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than the
proclivities of individuals" (p. 41).
These norms of impersonality are not inevitable and are not
unbreakable. Indeed one can likely think of examples where the
norms are violated-where the Justices do not comply with the
rule of Four,2 or where the Court talks skeptically about an
opinion as a "majority opinion" as opposed to a "majority of the
Court."22 But the fragility of the norms (and the fact that we notice
and bristle when they are ignored) underscores the power and the
importance of the norms to begin with.
III. BUILDING NORMS OF IMPERSONALITY FOR
PRECEDENT DISCUSSIONS
The fact that so many norms bind the nine Justices to act like
one institution makes me optimistic that a similar norm (or
norms) could be built to surround precedent discussions. But for
this to work there need to be at least two changes to existing
norms: (1) a retreat against the current custom of pursuing a "self
stare decisis"; and (2) an internal change to the timing of
precedent discussions.
A. THE UNHEALTHY NORM OF SELF STARE DECISIS
Supreme Court Justices often repeat resistance to a decision
even years after the ink on the decision dries in the U.S. Reports.
I've called this practice a "perpetual dissent ' ' 23 and it should not
take long for examples to come to mind: "I adhere to my belief
that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual
punishment" 24 ; "I continue to believe that campaign finance laws
are subject to strict scrutiny" 25 ; "I am not yet ready to adhere to
21. See Revesz & Karlan, supra note 9.
22. Justice Scalia remarked on this phenomenon. See Martinez v. Ct. of Appeal of
California, Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 165 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring)("I do
not share the apparent skepticism of today's opinion concerning the judgment of the Court(often curiously described as merely the judgment of 'the majority') in Faretta v.
California.").
23. Allison Orr Larsen, Perpetual Dissents, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 447 (2008).
24. Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 324 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
25. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 164 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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the proposition of law set forth in Seminole Tribe.'' 26 Perpetual
dissents like these range widely over subject matter and are not
confined to Justices of any particular ideology. 27 The most well-
known use of the perpetual dissent was Justice Brennan and
Justice Marshall repeating their view over 2,100 times that the
death penalty was unconstitutional. But although this may be the
most dramatic use of the perpetual dissent, Justices Brennan and
Marshall are not alone: "[t]raditionally conservative justices are
just as likely to dissent perpetually on issues such as abortion,
sentencing reform, or punitive damages.,
21
Perpetual dissents are not brand new, but they do not have a
long pedigree. It was not unusual as late as the 1930s for a Justice
to engage in "silent acquiescence" -to decide not to register his
disagreement with a decision in a dissent at all. Indeed separate
opinions generally are relatively recent; political scientists mark
the early 1940s as the moment in time where the Supreme Court
saw "'a radical and apparently permanent change' from unanimity
to 'surging rates of concurring and dissenting opinions.'
29
Importantly, these perpetual dissents are not generally
accompanied by discussions of stare decisis (as in whether the
Court should overrule the precedent due to changed
circumstances or unworkability or the like). Instead, the Justice
will repeat a dissent because of a continued distaste for the
controlling precedent-because he dissented originally and still
thinks the decision was wrong. The fact that a Justice dissented
originally, in other words, is reason enough to dissent again when
the rule from the first case is applied in a second case. A perpetual
dissent leads to a custom of selective engagement with precedents.
("I'm not bound by case X because I didn't join it originally.")
This norm can be seen as a form of "self stare decisis" -by
which I mean the apparently important need the Justices feel to
stay consistent over time as an individual jurist. Evidence for this
norm goes beyond the perpetual dissent. It is common for the
Justices to cite their own separate concurrences or dissents as
26. Coll. Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 699 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
27. Larsen, supra note 23, at 450.
28. Id. at 451 (citations omitted).
29. Id. at 450 (quoting Thomas Walker, On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual
Norms in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361, 361 (1988)).
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authorities in a new case.3" The Justices will also cite separate
opinions of their colleagues in an argumentative way as a means
of pointing out inconsistencies. And they will even argue that
because an individual Justice joined a prior dissent he or she
should be embarrassed to join a majority in a new case touching
on the same issue. 1 Indeed, sometimes one can even find an
explicit discussion by a Justice in one opinion explaining why it is
consistent with his views in the past.32 These types of discussions
reveal an anxiety a need the Justices feel to appear intellectually
consistent over time as an individual (hence, self stare decisis)
separate and apart from the debate about the law's need to be
settled versus right.
None of this is helpful for Professor Kozel's goal of fostering
impersonality at the Court. To be clear, I think it is perfectly
legitimate for a Justice to vote to overrule a precedent-
sometimes it is more important for the law to be right rather than
settled. My complaint instead is about venting individual disputes
about Supreme Court precedents when overruling the precedent
isn't even on the table. Those norms-the norms that reinforce
individual consistency over time as opposed to Court
consistency-erode the goal of impersonality at the Supreme
Court and detract from all of the rule-of-law reasons Professor
Kozel persuasively offers for why impersonality is critical.
There is an alternative. As Maurice Kelman suggested thirty
years ago, a Justice can "table" her dissenting view until a
majority of the Court agrees to revisit the question.33 This does
30. See, e.g., American Trucking Ass'n v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429,
439 (2005) (Thomas J., dissenting) ("[T]he negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the
text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in
application" (quoting Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S.
564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
31. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 US 93, 326 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("I
dissented in Austin, and continue to believe that the case represents an indefensible
departure from our tradition of free and robust debate. Two of my colleagues joined the
dissent including a Member of today's majority.").
32. See, e.g., United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 US 465, 479 (2003)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("I join the Court's opinion, satisfied that it is not inconsistent
with the opinion I wrote for the Court in United States v. Navajo Nation."); James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 545 (1991) (White, J., concurring) ("Nothing in the
above, however, is meant to suggest that I retreat from those opinions filed in this Court
which I wrote or joined holding or recognizing that in proper cases a new rule announced
by the Court will not be applied retroactively even to parties before the Court.").
33. Maurice Kelman, The Forked Path of Dissent, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 227, 230-31
(1985).
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not have to be done silently. A Justice could even note in
concurrence that he is "concurring under compulsion, abiding the
time when he may win over the majority."34 This was the path
opted for by the second Justice Harlan. Although Justice Harlan
was a known critic of Miranda and Mapp v. Ohio, he routinely
joined subsequent opinions that applied these precedents.35 Far
from sacrificing his own individual views on what was right, he was
just following a Supreme Court norm of-in Kelman's words-
"tabling" his dissenting view for the time being since revising the
precedent as a Court was not in the cards.
I suggest reviving the Justice Harlan norm of impersonality.
This "concurring under duress"36 approach strikes a middle
ground between allowing an individual Justice to stick to his guns
while also conceding that there is a linear connection between
individual Justices of the past and individual Justices of the
present and recognizing the importance of reinforcing that line
even at the expense of venting continued disagreement.
B. A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW NORM OF TIMING FOR PRECEDENT
DISCUSSIONS
I have a second proposal for advancing the norms of
impersonality with regard to Supreme Court precedent. Professor
Kozel has entirely persuaded me that the question of stare decisis
(the settled versus right debate) is too bogged down in principled
disagreements among the Justices about constitutional
methodology. Further he has convinced me that not only is the
discussion of whether to overrule a precedent mired in
disagreement on the merits, but so too is the discussion of when
the precedent controls to begin with. Thus a champion for
impersonality at the Court is facing a real uphill battle. The
problem goes beyond knowing when the time is right to make a
change in precedent (from, for example, Bowers to Lawrence or
Plessy to Brown); the problem extends to even knowing when the
time is right to have the discussion about whether the time is right.
34. Id. at 230-31.
35. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 327 (1969) (Harlan, J. concurring) ("The
passage of time has not made the Miranda case any more palatable to me than it was when
the case was decided . . . [but] purely out of respect for stare decisis, I reluctantly feel
compelled to acquiesce[.]").
36. See, e.g., Larsen, supra note 23, at 452.
20l1
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Professor Kozel makes strong efforts to find a doctrinal
solution to this problem. I wonder though if a separate route to
the same destination lies in adjusting Supreme Court norms. The
new norm would relate not to the content but to the timing of
precedent discussions. I propose bifurcating the internal
discussion at the Court about any particular case such that the
Justices first debate whether a precedent applies or whether it is
ripe for reversal before then turning to the merits of the case at
hand.
What I am suggesting is akin to an order of operations rule in
math. The Justices should debate the scope of a precedent first: is
there a prior decision on point? Or is the language in the prior
case just dicta -a judicial "aside or hypothetical" -that does not
earn binding effect? Second, assuming the prior case is on point,
then the Justices can further debate whether the precedent
deserves to be overruled. The second discussion can revolve
around the issues Professor Kozel identifies as things the Justices
should debate (the inquiry into workability, factual accuracy, and
whether this is an exceptional case where undesirable
consequences of a precedent should be given a shelf life) (pp. 99-
106). Only after those two discussions would the Justices then turn
to the merits or the case (if necessary). This bifurcated discussion
will, I think, significantly add to Professor Kozel's goal for
precedent generally- "that it allows some points to be taken as a
given rather than perpetually debated" (p. 15). Perhaps the
Justices need a chance to debate candidly with each other about
"what is given."
This separate opinion circulation-the precedent discussion
alone-could be done either orally (at Conference) or in written
form, but I think it is likely to be most valuable if it is kept private.
While I am in favor of transparency generally, norm generation
may take some internal politicking that should be shielded from
external scrutiny. The need that the Justices feel to stay internally
consistent as individuals might at least partially exist from
criticism originating from Court-watchers and academics. It might
foster more candid conversations for the nine to debate the scope
and applicability of precedent internally-free from eyes of
outsiders.
In this vein, consider how Justice Thomas describes the
Conference discussions (discussions kept secret from all but the
nine): "people are engaged; they actually talk about the case.
NORMS OF IMPERSONALITY
They actually tell you what they think and why... [a]nd there's
some back and forth... [even] discussions off to the sides."37 The
internal deliberation- the back and forth-is part of what justifies
a counter-majoritarian judiciary in the first place. Why not
leverage this candor to discuss one of the hardest things the Court
has on its plate-the settled versus right question. The ultimate
opinion disposing of the case would be published and would likely
include elements of the initial conversation. But by giving the
Justices space to debate precedent privately first, we encourage
the difficult cognitive task of separating "is this the outcome I
want?" from "is there a reason to overrule the past decision?"
Another benefit to a separate internal discussion on
precedent is to stem the temptation to distinguish precedents
artificially in order to avoid them. To be sure, there is nothing to
stop a determined Justice from disingenuously distinguishing a
precedent she does not want to deal with -either in a publicly
accessible opinion or an internally debated one. But one should
not overlook the power of internal dynamics, particularly from
repeat players who work closely together for decades and are
committed to being a ''we."
Why would the Justices adopt this new procedural custom,
particularly if they have the votes to do what they want to do
without it? For one thing, the Justices might be more likely to
reach agreement in the abstract rather than when a concrete
outcome is on the table. There are reasons we have a preliminary
discussion on the rules of a poker game, for example, at a moment
before the cards are dealt. Assuming everyone at the table thinks
agreement is a good thing, it is easier to get there before we know
what cards we have and are differently invested in the results.
Certainly some of the "cards" are already dealt at the Court-the
Justices hold various commitments to stare decisis that reflect
their interpretive methodology. But even so, the conversation
dynamics change when the issue is front and center and the battle
lines are drawn. Thus, perhaps a new norm about the timing of
precedent discussion could be instituted at an annual retreat, or a
discussion among the Justices that is otherwise independent from
the merits of any particular issue.
Still, why would the Justices have the motivation to bind
themselves in this way? It is important to remember that of all the
37. CUSHMAN, supra note 15, at 152.
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firm advocates for impersonality at the Supreme Court (including
Professor Kozel and myself), the Justices themselves are the true
believers. The Justices don't want to believe that "power not
reason is the currency of the Court's decision-making" (p. 35). It
is the Justices themselves who promote the view that the
Constitution "truly is more than what five Justices say it is" (p. 5).
The "we're all in this together" sentiment voiced by Justice
O'Connor is very much a real sentiment at the Court, buttressed
by years of norms that reinforce it.
What is often overlooked-but is important to recognize-is
that this norm of impersonality is not just crucial for the
appearance of legitimacy to the outside world, but it is also central
to the way the Justices view each other. When describing what
Conference looks like from the inside, Justice Kennedy explained:
It's like being an attorney once again.... We sometimes have
as many as six cases and I have to present the argument ... and
I have to be professional and accurate and fair. And each of my
colleagues feels the same way so there is a little tension and
excitement in the room, but we love it. We're lawyers, we're
designed to do that.38
It is that internal commitment to being "professional and
accurate and fair" (in Justice Kennedy's words) that I think can
be used to improve the Court's approach to precedent. The
Justices can be trusted to call each other out for shenanigans
(disingenuous distinctions, for example) when they are given the
space to do so.
At bottom, my suggestion is to take what the Supreme Court
already seems to have -an internal commitment to impersonality
and (relatedly) an ambition to strive to protect the rule of law-
and leverage that institutional desire to improve discussion of
precedent. By separating the discussion of precedent from the
discussion on the merits and cementing that bifurcation as a
Supreme Court norm, we may be able to achieve Professor
Kozel's goal of "using precedent to bridge judicial
disagreements." We are using Supreme Court custom and
commitment to legal reasoning to achieve a more objective
conversation about the hardest choices they must make. Along
the way we remind each other of the important last lines of
38. CUSHMAN, supra note 15, at 147.
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Professor Kozel's book: "Judges come and go but the law remains
the law. That is the promise of precedent" (p. 176).
